

## **An International Approach to Training Standards**

### **Outline of talk**

When I was given this topic to present – An International Approach to Training Standards – I thought, ‘this is a huge area, how can I best approach it’ – there is such a choice of areas to discuss. I’ve gone for ‘wanting to leave all of us here with something to ponder and maybe to consider the whole process of how we train cabin crew on a global basis with particular deference to where we are currently at in the UK.’

The recently published HF review Phase One report from the UK CAA identified some areas of risk offered by those contributing as:

- Inappropriate passenger behaviour.
- Chronic fatigue
- Chronic stress
- Automation
- Slow onset hypoxia

Although currently being validated, with the exception of Automation, I would suggest that these top risk areas are of particular interest to the international cabin crew community.

Furthermore, comments also on this report regarding training cite:

- Training is too tick box
- Operators want contextual setting of HF within Threat Error Management and SMS
- Operators want a commonly held approach to training across aviation communities
- Operators want practical application of behavioural HF
- The need to train for abnormal not just emergency

Again – these factors were not specifically directed to the cabin crew community but how valid the findings are. How many cabin crew really understand the term ‘non normal’ as opposed to ‘emergency’? – I would suggest that much of our training concentrates on SOP’s as normal and then emergency procedures – it’s one or the other with very little time given to describe the non-normal grey areas. A paragraph in the cabin crew procedures manual and a short session delivered during new entrant training – we of course try to develop this during recurrent training which we will come back to. Examples of non-normal may be engine warning/vibration or perhaps a suspected hydraulic leak – both maybe requiring a diversion and possible precautionary landing with a cabin crew brief..

CC are the biggest working community in this industry. There are presently approx 32000 cabin crew in the UK alone.

- EU OPS 1.995 states ‘a cabin crew member must be at least 18 years of age.
- Futhermore, OPS 1.1000 states that a cabin crew member may become a SCCM after 12 months of operational experience and has completed an appropriate course.’

### **Accident examples**

Kegworth and Dryden, both in 1989 are really the last accidents where cabin crew have been made significantly aware of the part they have to play in an error chain. We still use these examples in training, as – let’s be clear – there were excellent training videos

produced as valuable resources to support our sessions and I personally remember these accidents so well. However, when you refer to these accidents during a new entrant cabin crew course, the common response is 'that was before I was born.' Sadly, during a course recently over half of the trainee cabin crew did not know what we meant by September 11<sup>th</sup>.

Flight Crew operate an a/c from A to B – all other resource groups inc cabin crew support that process.

How do we train new entrant cabin crew to manage risk and be vigilant where the actual probability of an incident is very low?

How do we train young people who have no recollection of the history of where we are today and how, nor any knowledge of how we have developed robust risk management procedures and operations to create an industry which is far safer than any other high risk industry?

How do we train and encourage them to appreciate the tangible risks that are there and to be continually aware of the valuable safety resource they represent?

There is no requirement for line training and checking although many operators will do this as best practice and this is reflected in their Training Manual. However, this is being significantly reduced due to constant economical pressures.

### **Corporate Aviation**

Please consider for a moment the corporate aviation industry whereby with a pax seat config of less than 19 seats, cabin crew are not required. They are often referred to as in flight service providers or cabin attendants. Is the passenger aware of this difference? Very often the Principal is aware but what about a passenger chartering a corporate jet? Do the flight crew fully understand that these cabin attendants cannot carry out any safety related task whatsoever? Are they aware of their safety responsibilities in an emergency?

An example would be the Teterboro Challenger accident in 2005. The a/c ran off the departure end of runway 6 at Teterboro Airport at 110 knots; through an airport perimeter fence; across the highway and into a parking lot before impacting a building. The two pilots were seriously injured, as were two occupants in a vehicle. The cabin attendant, eight passengers, and one person in the building received minor injuries.

Four passengers were not wearing seatbelts

The Cabin Attendant (ISP) could not open the exit

The Captain did not complete the pre-flight briefing to the passengers – he assumed the cabin attendant would complete it

### **Senior Cabin Crew**

As mentioned, SCCM will go through additional senior training – and many operators have additional requirements to those laid down in EU OPS. One operator for example insists on min of 12 months with the operator itself even if they have operated as seniors for other carriers.

Newly promoted seniors must be trained in procedural and human factors – again there is no requirement for line training and checking although again most operators will do this as best practice. Don't get me wrong – when things go wrong how often do we hear 'the training kicked in' – Hudson River etc – however I wonder if the high level of experience on that flight played a part in the reaction of the cabin crew and the passenger management.

We can show the effect of experience versus non-experience – a quote from one training manager - 'the training and technical knowledge level is the same for all our seniors, however experienced they are – it is the confidence level that makes the difference. Juniors will hide behind seniors and then they become seniors themselves. How do we train confidence and life experience?'

At least as flight crew, they get to do their LPC and OPC and demonstrate their proficiency.

TGL 44 – IEM 1.1000 states 'SCCM training – HF and CRM – where practicable this should include the participation of SCCM in flt sim LOFT exercises. How often does that happen – I would suggest that the flight deck is an unfamiliar world for many of our senior cabin crew – they have no practical observation experience of how the flight deck is operated and the workload managed.

### **Recurrent Training**

As well as initial, conversion and upgrade training we conduct recurrent CRM training. We follow a syllabus and we refresh this every year during our recurrent training.

Nowadays, joint flight crew and cabin crew training is common practise. Cabin crew are clued up on winter ops and a/c terminology to marry in with flight crew – left and right. Both learning points from Dryden and Kegworth.

Many operators carry out integrated SEP/CRM training. Let us consider some examples.

**Fire training.** An operator with many nationalities – they pride themselves on this. However how does this work when crew members are under stress? Communications on the interphone when both languages are different – you can train for this by role play, role play and more role play and practice – but how much time do we give to practical training compared to the theoretical part? The focus tends to be on passing the exams – all procedure related.

Many operators now try and include at least one practical scenario during recurrent training. How effective is it – how effectively do the trainers bring out the non-SOP and HF elements during the debrief?

How many of the trainers are trained and **developed** in effective debriefing skills?

The tendency is to run the exercise and discuss briefly how it went and were procedures carried out correctly – the exercise is the resource/tool for the debrief from which comes the learning:

How many trainers are aware of this?

Do we allow sufficient time for training and learning during recurrent training or is it mainly around checking?

Joint training – how much do the flight crew learn during this process?  
How many of you here today come from operators who have reduced their training times over the past few years?

### **Applying training from classroom to line ops**

Training – unless carried from classroom to line is an utter waste of time – it ticks boxes – lets' look at some examples. All of these I have either observed or been told about during the past month. All on UK/northern europe operators – and we are supposed to be ahead of the game. Maybe I have just witnessed a bad run, but here goes!

1. Coats, chat and legs crossed on take off and landing. IFE locker open as procedures but contents not secured. Same pattern for return flight with a different crew. CC standing in front of the video screen so passengers could not see demo
2. Cabin crew member sitting on A320 on aisle mounted seat as per procedure for take-off so she can see down cabin. PA had gone to take seats for landing. Pax proceeded to stand up with baby and pass baby over seats to another adult and then opened and went into overhead locker. Cabin crew member was sitting on crew seat reading the daily newspaper
3. Oxygen bottle on a/c stowed in an overhead locker and not secured in position.

As said, a move forward has been to integrate SEP and CRM during recurrent training. This is a great idea but focus is still on procedures. Ask many trainers what elements/topic of CRM are they trying to bring out during an exercise and they will not know.

How many cabin crew do not know their stuff or is it that they sometimes choose not to do apply it correctly?

Does that cabin crew member not know that he should not be reading the daily rag on the crew seat. Maybe these are random examples.

I feel that maybe we also need to focus on the positive here. We have trained this concept of assertiveness with gusto over the past years and we are aware that other industries are following this lead. Medical and rail industries are now training their personnel in non-technical skills.

### **Other areas of the world**

Let us start to move into other areas of the world. The expanding areas of aviation are certainly not in Europe – we need to move to the Middle East, sub-continent and Far East. Considering many operators in the sub-continent – they are now introducing HF/CRM training for senior cabin crew upgrade. CRM is a new element of training and, from the courses that I have delivered and experienced these operators would like to look to us for guidance as we are the so called 'old hands.'

In areas of the world where the industry is growing so rapidly – these countries are traditionally service orientated and have a steep authority gradient within their national culture – and your flight crew are operating out there in the winter months with your a/c and flight crew and a local cabin crew.

They may have been trained to the required procedures of your company but how about the HF issue?

How do they manage situations?

Will they tell you of any concerns?

I suggest it is a very different world and this is where the industry is booming – not over here.

### **Questions to consider**

So – my questions are:

1. How do we train effective risk management in a high risk industry to 18/19 year olds when this is the age group for risk taking and exploring?
2. How do we train our seniors to lead their team effectively?

Do we concentrate on the youngsters who have joined an airline – let's be honest – for fun and a good time and will probably quit after a season? Or – do we concentrate on training our seniors as professionals with proper leadership training? We are supposed to do all this within the scope of SMS – let every employee know their safety responsibility and effective risk management.

Is this working out there on line?

Do our seniors feel supported by their company – let's look at this topic of hand luggage. A recent Safety Notice from the CAA has outlined the increasing problem with hand luggage and the fact that so much is making its way onto the a/c and highlights the ensuing problems for cabin crew – if the problem is systems related – as in the system is not working by allowing all this to get up the a/c steps – why do we not address this through SMS and risk management strategies – or do we leave it to the cabin crew to do the best they can on the day?

Let us think internationally again and I share with you an example given to me during a recent CRMI course. A passenger sat at the overwing exit row carrying a huge traditional overcoat. He was asked to either change seats or place the coat in the overhead locker – he chose option 2 and then promptly refused to be briefed for the exit by a female cabin crew member. After landing the passenger complained to chairman and the crew were suspended for two weeks on no pay.

The cabin crew working for this operator no longer feel empowered to move/brief passengers sat at self-help exits who may be difficult.

### **Conclusion**

As an industry we are pretty good as we well know. However the industry is growing on an international basis and have we ever stood still for one minute and considered the cultural issues we really have and what is really going on out there on line?

How effective is our training of cabin crew? We increasingly rely on CBT and e-learning to reduce course lengths – great idea and helps to pass those exams.

How can someone be a fully functional crew member after a 3 week course and various amounts of line training and checking?

Because of the costs and difficulties involved in changing this situation, it is possibly too late to back-track - it goes into the remit of idealism. However – how about looking at those people who have shown commitment to the job and operator and are now ready to be seniors or hungry to be developed in their role as a senior.

Are we being fair to them?

Are we expecting too much from them?

Have we trained them adequately?

How do we encourage them to buy into our SMS and vision and continue to be top of the tree within high risk industries if we do not invest in them and empower them in the first place.

Finally I would like to take us back to the Human Factors review whereby the brief is to provide a coherent, consensual and authoritative strategy for Human Factors which EASA has asked to take as a basis for an EU equivalent. If anyone would like to contribute or suggest on behalf of the cabin crew community, please email [human.factors@caa.co.uk](mailto:human.factors@caa.co.uk).

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